An Originalist's Evaluation of Modern Takings
Jurisprudence
All across the country it is conspicuous that many liberals who
construe the constitutional "privacy" value expansively to en-

large abortion rights construe it narrowly when property rights
are at risk.1
The nationwide property rights revolt has begun.2 As with
other movements, it appears to have spawned from-and indeed
has its most fervid sentiments in-the various local level rebellions.' Recently, the movement has taken on a much larger significance: the United States Congress has proposed legislation that
would minimize the federal government's interference with private
property rights.4
These sentiments may be attributable, in part, to the capricious nature of property rights generated by the Supreme Court's
I George F. Will, Extortionist City Government, WASH. PosT, Mar. 20, 1994, at C7.
Richard Miniter, You Just Can't Take It Anymore: America's Property Rights Revolt,
POL'Y REv., Fall 1994, at 40.
3 Id. Specifically, Mr. Miniter wrote:
Meet the grass-roots rebels of the 1990s: The private property
rights movement. Like the early tax rebels, these activists were often
strangers to politics until the government disrupted their lives. Their
cause promises to have similarly dramatic results.
Indeed, the property rights revolt already is changing the political
calculus in Washington. There are more than 500 active property rights
groups across the country, with a total of some 2 million members.
They have helped thwart the environmental agenda in Congress and
several federal agencies, successfully pushed legislation in a [sic] more
than a dozen state legislatures, helped elect at least a score of state and
federal lawmakers, and won key cases in the courts, including two
landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases. like supply-side economics, the
movement has touched off a paradigm shift in the way many view property rights. All of these accomplishments from a movement that didn't
exist five years ago.
Id.
4 See, e.g., Private Property Rights Act of 1994, S.2006, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1-8
(1994). The purpose of the Act is "to minimize takings of private property by the
Federal Government." Id. at § 3. It requires that:
[A]lI agencies of the Federal Government shall submit a certification to
the Attorney General of the United States that a private property taking
impact analysis has been completed before issuing or promulgating any
policy, regulation, proposal, recommendation (including any recommendation or report on proposal for legislation), or related agency action which could result in a taking or diminution of use or value of
private property.
Id. at § 5(a)(2); see also Private Property Rights Act of 1995, S.22, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995).
2
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traditionally convoluted takings jurisprudence.5 The past decade,
however, has witnessed a distinct trend in the Court's decisions
that has benefitted property owners. 6 Those favoring the trend are
pleased because, in their view, it is consonant with the express principles of the Constitution's framers.7
To evaluate this contention, a brief look at the constitutional
philosophy known as "originalism" is in order. Judge Robert H.
Bork, one of the most famous and eloquent spokesmen for original
understanding in our time, provided a trenchant exposition of it in
his treatise, The Tempting of America.8 According to Bork, originalism refers to adjudication that adheres to the principle, or major
5 See, e.g., Peter P. Cvek, Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, in THE
BILL OF RlIrrs: BICENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS 131, 131-32 (Yeager Hudson & Creighton
Peden eds., 1993) (stating that contradictory takings case law continues to engender
intense controversy). Mr. Cvek provides a famous example of the "takings muddle"
by comparing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978), and
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982):
In Penn Central, the Court upheld a municipal landmark preservation
law which prohibited the construction of a high-rise office building over
property in New York City. While in Loretto, the Court struck down a
state law requiring landlords to allow the installation of cable television
lines on their rental property. For many legal scholars, something certainly has gone wrong when the Court could rule in the first instance,
where a property owner stood to lose millions of dollars, that no compensation was required, but then require compensation in the second
instance for what was admittedly a "minor" physical occupation. Despite the best efforts of the Supreme Court and cadres of legal scholars
to explain the reasoning behind these divergent decisions, takings jurisprudence continues to be a source of intense controversy.
Id.
6 See William W. Fisher III, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1774, 1774 (1988) (discussing cases largely considered
favorable to property holders). But see Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In
Search of Underlying Principles (PartI), 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1303-04 (1989) (opining
that despite common perceptions, the Court's current takings jurisprudence is still in
disarray). For a discussion of the most significant of these cases, see infranotes 141-97
and accompanying text.
7 See Will, supra note 1, at C7 (stating that "property rights are a privacy right the
Constitution explicitly protects, because the Framers understood that liberty is no
stronger than the protections accorded property").
8 See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). Judge Robert Bork was a professor of law at Yale, U.S.
Solicitor General and Acting Attorney General in the Nixon Administration, and a
federal appellate court judge for the District of Columbia. Jodi Cleesattle, The Man
Who Would Be Justice, THE NAT'L JURIST, Jan. 1993, at 9, 12, 13. In 1987, President
Reagan nominated Judge Bork to the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 8. Because of his prolific writings on the subject of originalism, various special-interest
groups, such as the National Abortion Rights Action League and the National Organization for Women, mobilized campaigns against his nomination. Id. at 9. After a
controversial and heated confirmation battle, the Senate rejected the nomination of
Judge Bork to the Supreme Court. Id. at 8. Currently, Judge Bork is a legal scholar at
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premise, intended by the men who ratified the Constitution. 9
Originalist judicial understanding requires formulation of that
premise,1" after which the presiding judge must determine
whether it is threatened or undermined by the challenged state
action.'
This determination provides the minor premise of the
judicial syllogism, from which the conclusion follows. 2
This Comment examines the Court's most recent and complete pronouncement of its takings doctrine in Dolan v. City of
Tigard- Part I of this Comment examines the text of the Takings
Clause.14 The history of governmental takings prior to the advent
ofjust compensation requirements is explored in Part I.5 Part III
probes the change in the ideological climate of the American colonies, and the concomitant rise ofjust compensation clauses in various pieces of legislation.' 6 The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as understood by its author, James Madison, and
early theorists and cases, is discussed in Part IV. 7 Part V analyzes
the modern takings cases, culminating with a comprehensive discussion of Dolan. 8 Finally, this Comment concludes that the
Court's current construction of the Takings Clause is a laudable
effort to remain loyal to its original purpose.1 9
the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., a guest lecturer, and legal
counsel for special cases. Id. at 9.
9 BoRiK, supra note 8, at 143, 162.
10 Id. at 162. According to Judge Bork, formulation of the premise is accomplished by referring to the abundant historical sources on the topic. Id. at 165. These
include, but are not limited to, the constitutional text, the ratification debates, the
FederalistPapers, and early constructions of the Constitution by courts and scholars
familiar with the authoritative thought of the time. Id.
11 Id. at 163.
12 Id. In applying this method, Judge Bork admonishes fellow jurists, stating that:
We must not expect too much of the search for original understanding
in any legal context. The result of the search is never perfection; it is
simply the best we can do; and the best we can do must be regarded as
good enough--or we must abandon the enterprise of law and, most
especially, that of judicial review.
Id.
13 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319, 2321 (1994) (holding that the City of Tigard failed to
meet the evidentiary burden necessary to establish "rough proportionality"). For a
discussion of the rough proportionality test, see infra notes 177-87 and accompanying
text.
14 See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 25-62 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 85-119 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 120-97 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
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THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

The starting point of original understanding entails an examination of the controlling textual provision. 2° The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause declares, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."21 The clause
presumes the power of eminent domain while simultaneously placing restrictions on the exercise of that power: the government may
seize an individual's property, but only for a public purpose, and it
must provide just compensation.2 2 As with other constitutional
provisions phrased in general language, 23 however, the Takings
Clause raises more questions than it answers. 4
II.

TAKINGS PRIOR TO THE JUST COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT

To fully appreciate the original purpose of the Takings Clause,
it may be helpful to examine the historical background against
which it stands.2 5 As mentioned previously,2 6 history aids in the
formulation or discovery of the major premise laid down by the
Constitution's framers. 7 It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the
body of law that had a profound impact on the American framers,
the English common law. 8
20 BoR, supra note 8, at 162.

21 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in full:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Id.
22 See, e.g., Cvek, supra note 5, at 131.
23 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (providing that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
24 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1977)
("Like many other fundamental provisions... the compensation clause is couched in
language of such abstraction as to strike terror in the hearts of literalists who imagine
that the constitutional text will somehow reveal its secrets without the further intervention of human minds. .. ").
25 See BoRiu, supra note 8, at 165 (listing numerous historical sources for constitutional understanding, including Constitutional Convention records, contemporary
newspaper articles, the FederalistPapers, and various treatises).
26 See discussion supra note 10.
27 See BoRK, supra note 8, at 165 (discussing historical sources of constitutional
interpretation).
28 See FORREST McDoNALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
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The English Common Law

American property law in general, and the Just Compensation
Clause specifically, are deeply rooted in the English common law
tradition.2 9 Although Americans were still in the aftermath of
throwing off the yoke of British imperialism, the consensus among
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was to employ
the British Constitution as a guide to drafting the new American
plan of government.3" In his prodigious treatise on the Constitution, Justice Joseph Story, a man thoroughly abreast of the intellectual climate pervading the Convention," declared that the Takings
Clause memorializes the common law's traditionally protective
OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1985) (discussing the influence of English political institu-

tions and common law on the American colonies).
29 See Gordon S. Wood, Preface to LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ix, xii (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989);

see also Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the
Relationshipbetween IndividualLibertiesand ConstitutionalStructure, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY,
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra, 141, 150 (stating that
the idea of the Takings Clause was "deeply embedded in both the common law and
natural law traditions").
In his essay on the historical significance of the Takings Clause, Professor
Scheiber noted that the Framers
were eighteenth-century political men; and educated persons of that era
were keenly aware of property ownership and its claims, the interplay of
property and political consent and allegiance, the place of property in
political theory from Locke's writings to their own time. They were also

well versed in the maxims of the common law, a law profoundly protective of quiet possession and concerned with the proper legal boundaries
of governmental and private action against property owners' claims.
They knew and despised the depredations of the Stuart kings in their
disregard of parliamentary prerogatives in regard to life, liberty, and
property of the political opposition. All these were core elements of
political consciousness and the lexicon of political values well known to
them. This is important to remember as we try to reconstruct the milieu and the intellectual context of the takings clause in the Bill of
Rights.
Harry N. Scheiber, The "Takings" Clause and the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent and
Significance in American Legal Development, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, ORIGINAL MEANING
AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 233, 234 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) (footnotes
omitted).
30 See McDONALD, supra note 28, at 6 (stating that only a small minority of dele-

gates questioned the usefulness of the British Constitution as a model for the new
American government).
For an interesting discussion of the British Constitution's relation to Natural Law
and the American Constitution, see Russell Kirk, NaturalLaw and the Constitutionof the
United States, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1035, 1038 (1994) (noting that in 1775, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England was as widely read in America as it was in
Great Britain, notwithstanding the difference in population).
31

Bomx., supra note 8, at 165.
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view of private property.3 2
The right of property at common law was not a solitary concept.3 3 Instead, property was an elaborate bundle of customs,
rights, expectations, and obligations regarding the relationships
among individuals, society, and the state. 34 It was one of the traditional "rights of Englishmen" that the English, and later the Americans, held sacred. 5 While precise definition of this right has
remained elusive, that proffered by William Blackstone has been
the most influential.3 6 This definition, 7 along with those found in
eighteenth-century legal dictionaries, precludes the existence of a
property right when there is infringement upon another's property.3 The harm-benefit distinction embodied in Lord Blackstone's definition was a fundamental principle of the common
39
law.
A logical corollary to the harm-benefit distinction, which implies that property may be regulated to abate harm, is the proscription against compelling benefits from an individual property owner
for the enjoyment of many.40 English law forbade arbitrary
32 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
661 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833). Specifically, Justice Story described the
Takings Clause as "an affirmance of a great doctrine established by the common law
for the protection of private property." Id. (footnote omitted).
33 MCDONALD, supra note 28, at 13; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 22-23 (1985) (stating that for centuries, the term "private property" has had a web of meanings surrounding its use).
34 JESSE DUKEMINIER AND JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 86 (3d ed. 1993).
35 Id. The "rights of Englishmen" included, in addition to property, the right of
liberty. McDONALD, supra note 28, at 13.
36 See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original UnderstandingOf The Taking Clause Is Neither
Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1635 (1988); see also EPSTEIN, supranote 33,
at 22-23 (explaining that Blackstone's definition is sufficiently comprehensive and
flexible to withstand the reservations of modem professors).
37 See 2 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1-2. Blackstone wrote:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property;, or that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.
Id.
This right, Lord Blackstone added, "consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all ... acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws
of the land." 1 WILLIAM BLACICSroNE, COMMENTARIES *138.
38 See Kmiec, supra note 36, at 1635.
39 See id. (tracing the historical development and effect of the harm-benefit
distinction).
40 Id. at 1636-37 (quotation omitted). For example, it is impermissible to compel a
property owner to relinquish his land to provide a parking lot for the public's convenience; but such an order is constitutional where the need for a parking lot results
primarily from activity on his own land. Id. at 1636 (quotation omitted).
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seizures of property by the Crown, requiring that all takings be authorized by public law.41 Indeed, not until the latter-half of the
eighteenth century could the power of eminent domain be exercised without specific authorization from Parliament.4 2 Even then,
it could not be used as a vehicle for the redistribution of wealth.4 3
A legitimate public purpose for the taking had to exist; thus, property could not simply be taken from A and given to B, even if accompanied by just compensation.44 Moreover, even when eminent
domain was validly exercised, the individual property owner could
not be divested of title: he enjoyed the full incidents of ownership,
4
subject only to an easement held by the government.
B.

Early American Experience

Despite the dictates of the English common law, early American legislatures exhibited little restraint in their abridgement of
private property rights.46 It is necessary to examine these early
practices because, clearly, they occupied the minds of those who
ratified the Fifth Amendment-particularly the Takings Clause.47
In pre-Revolutionary America, the colonies, especially those in
New England, usually appropriated individual property for the
construction of town roads.48 Acting pursuant to legislative delegation or royal decree, these governments contrived sophistic reasons
for denying an award of just compensation.4 9 For example, because a road was only a public right of way across property, legisla41 McDONALD, supra note 28, at 12, 22. In addition to being embedded in English
common law, this principle was codified in the Magna Carta and confirmed by Parliament in the 14th and 18th centuries. Id. at 12.
42 Id. at 22. Under the Highway Act of 13 George III, c.78, "property could be
taken by the action of two justices, provided that reasonable compensation (with appeal to jury trial in the event of disagreement) be paid the owner." Id. (citation
omitted).
43 See id. (discussing the public purpose requirement for land seizures).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See id. (noting that unlike the British government, "American legislatures had
been less squeamish about invading private property rights"); see also William M.
Treanor, The Origins and OriginalSignificance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1985) (observing that "[e]ighteenth-century colonial legislatures regularly took private property without compensating the owner").
47 See Scheiber, supra note 29, at 237 (remarking that in reference to the precarious status of eighteenth-century property rights, "one cannot doubt that this sort of
activity by government was in the mind of those who voted on the Fifth Amendment
language when, with its takings clause, it went before Congress and then to the
states").

48 McDONALD, supra note 28, at 22.
49 See id. at 22-23 (stating that "the legal position was that nothing had been taken
from the owners and thus no compensation need be forthcoming").
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tures did not consider use of the property to be a taking and thus
did not require compensation: simply allowing landowners to retain a portion of their land constituted sufficient compensation in
and of itselfi5 Although legislatures were less reluctant to provide
compensation for the taking of enclosed or improved land, Massachusetts remained the only colony to compensate citizens for public roads traversing unimproved tracts.5 1
With the advent of the American Revolution, the colonies
achieved independence from the English Crown; American property owners, however, failed to win independence from government takings.5 2 The uncompensated takings of undeveloped lands
for roads continued, along with the impressment of civilian goods
for military use and the seizure of property belonging to Tory Loyalists, those Americans remaining loyal to the English Crown.5 3
State governments paid compensation only as required by specific
statutes or judicial decisions, rather than as a matter of state constiId.
Treanor, supra note 46, at 695. The government generally avoided paying compensation to the owners of unimproved tracts because the practice fostered economic
growth by reducing the cost of road construction and encouraging the productive use
of resources. Id. at 696-97. Moreover, because all private property ownership was
believed to originate with the sovereign or legislative grant, and a condition of the
grant was settlement of the property, government officials justified the seizures by
maintaining that the condition was never satisfied. Id. at 697.
52 Id. at 698. In discussing the ambient political climate of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Madison observed that the ideological underpinnings of the
American Revolution conduced to a blatant disregard of property rights:
The necessity of thus guarding the rights of property was for obvious
reasons unattended to in the commencement of the Revolution. In all
the Governments which were considered as beacons to republican patriots [and] lawgivers, the rights of persons were subjected to those of
property. The poor were sacrificed to the rich. In the existing state of
American population, [and] American property the two classes of rights
were so little discriminated that a provision for the rights of persons was
supposed to include of itself those of property, and it was natural to
infer from the tendency of republican laws, that these different interests
would be more and more identified. Experience and investigation have
however produced more correct ideas on this subject.
11 JAMES MADISON, Observations on the "Draughtof a Constitutionfor Virginia," (1788), in
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 287 (Robert A. Rutland and Charles F. Hobson eds.,
1977).
53 Treanor, supra note 46, at 698; see also McConnell, supra note 29, at 150 (explaining that the seizure of Tory Loyalists' property was exempted from the general
requirement ofjust compensation). In addition to land seizures by government, takings of property by the poor during violent disturbances were a common occurrence
in the 18th century. Michael Parenti, A Constitution for the Few, in 1 TAKING SIDES,
50
51

CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY, THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO RECONSTRUCTION 162, 171 (Larry Madaras &James M. SoRelle eds., 1993).
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tutional right.5 4 Such takings continued because none of the early
state constitutions contained provisions for just compensation.5 5
This scant respect for private property rights was consistent
with the basic doctrines of republicanism, the prevailing ideology
of colonial America.5 6 In traditional republican thought, emphasis
is placed on furthering the common good, and the state acts as the
primary instrument used to direct individual citizens toward that
end.5 7 The needs of society, according to republican philosophy,
54
55
56
57

McConnell, supra note 29, at 150.
Treanor, supra note 46, at 698.
Id. at 699.
Id. The ideological counterpart to republican philosophy is liberalism.

SeeJEN-

NIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMrrs OF AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONALISM:

170 (1990) (commenting on the debate
surrounding the origin of American constitutional tradition, and whether that origin
is republican or liberal). Lance Banning distinguished these two prominent philosophies as follows:
Liberalism is a label most would use for a political philosophy that regards man as possessed of inherent individual rights and the state as
existing to protect those rights, deriving its authority from consent.
Classical republicanismis a term that scholars have employed to identify a
mode of thinking about citizenship and the polity that may be traced
from Aristotle through Machiavelli and Harrington to eighteenth-century Britain and her colonies.... A full blown, modern liberalism, as
Joyce] Appleby and [Isaac] Kramnick appear to use the term, posits a
society of equal individuals who are motivated principally if not exclusively by their passion or self-interest; it identified a proper government
as one existing to protect these individuals' inherent rights and private
pursuits. A fully classical republicanism, as J. G. A.] Pocock may best
explain, reasons from the diverse capacities and characteristics of different social groups, whose members are political by nature. No republicanism will still be "classical" if it is not concerned with the individual's
participation with others in civic decisions, where the needs and powers
of others must be taken into account. Liberalism, thus defined, is comfortable with economic man, with the individual who is intent on maximizing private satisfactions and who needs to do no more in order to
serve the public good. Classical republicanism regards this merely economic man as less than fully human.
Id. at 171 (quoting Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology, WM. & MARY Q., Jan. 1986, at
11-12).
Professor Radin's distinction between republicanism and liberalism is simple, yet
instructive: "If we see the government as 'them' we adopt a 'liberal' theory of politics,
and if we see the government as 'us' we adopt a 'republican' theory of politics." Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception Of Property: Cross Currents In The JurisprudenceOf
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1693 (1988).
A key component of republican thought was faith in legislatures. Treanor, supra
note 46, at 700-01. Because legislatures were the voice of the polity and could be
trusted to define and promote the common good, the authors of early state constitutions placed enormous discretion in the legislative branch and did not include just
compensation clauses. Id.
THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY
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must always transcend the rights of individuals.5" Indeed, classical
republicanism is a clear example of statecraft as soulcraft.59
Property's societal role occupied a place of special concern in
republican ideology: it required a delicate balance of competing
interests.6" While citizens required some amount of property, for
such uses as a workshop or farm in order to pursue the common
good, republicanism also recognized that the desire to accumulate
property could corrupt citizens and have them place their own interests above those of the state. 61 Therefore, in republican
thought, the state acts as a guardian with the power to infringe on
individual property rights to foster common or societal interests.62
III.

THE RISE OF THE JUST COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT

The late eighteenth century witnessed the displacement of republican notions of government with liberalism. 63 In the post-Revolutionary political landscape, liberalism ascended as the
preponderant philosophy in American political and economic discourse. 64 Although not categorically rejecting republicanism, the
Founding Fathers desired to radically reshape it by supplementing
it with the fundamental tenets of liberalism.65
58 See Treanor, sup-a note 46, at 699 (noting that "[individual rights played no
more than a secondary role in republican thought").
59 See id. (stating that republicanism regards "[tihe state's proper role [as consisting] in large part of fostering virtue, of making the individual unselfishly devote himself to the common good").
60 Id.
61 Id.

62 See id. at 699-700 (explaining that "a major strand of republican thought held
that the state could abridge the property right in order to promote common interests"). Arguably, Jefferson's decision to list "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"

as inalienable rights in the Declaration of Independence, instead of "life, liberty, and
property," was prompted by republican motives. Id. at 700.
63 Id. at 703-04. The debate between republicanism and liberalism reached its climax during the French Revolution, when republicans embraced Edmund Burke's violently reproachful Reflections on the Revolution in Franc4 and liberals, like Jefferson,

espoused the ideals of Thomas Paine's The Rights of Man, a libertarian response to
Burke. RIcARD HOFSTADTER ET AL., THE UNITED STATES: THE HISTORY OF A REPUBLIC
149 (1957).
64 Cathy Matson, American Political Economy in the Constitutional Decade, in THE
THE FIRST 200 YEARS 16, 17 (RC. Simmons ed., 1989).
65 Id. Specifically, the Founders "faced the need to retain republican order and

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:

elite, propertied rule, while also freeing Americans to pursue property according to
natural rights and common law, in a manner which suited the materialism and mobility of expanding Americans." Id.; see alsoJean Yarbrough, Jefferson and Property Rights,
in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra
note 29, at 65 (asserting that "although Jefferson's view of property was essentially

liberal, his liberalism was qualified by his understanding of the requirements of republican government and his view of human nature").
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This new reigning philosophy had several distinguishing characteristics: first, the faith in legislatures that typified republican
ideology eroded.66 With legislatures no longer partners in resistance to imperialist Britain, individuals began to view lawmaking
bodies as antagonists seeking to grow vigorously and luxuriantly at
the expense of individual freedoms.6 7 Citizens began to question
the ability of local government to discern the common good, and
they focused on the exaltation of self-interest and furtherance of
the common good by private moral commitment rather than by
coercive state edicts. 68
Liberalism also championed a novel concern for individual
rights.6 9 A planted axiom of liberalism is that man possesses certain rights that are natural and inalienable. 70 Thus, the primary
purpose of government, according to liberal ideology, is to secure
those rights from infringement rather than to promote the common interests of the polity at any cost. 71 Indeed, liberal theory
posits that government derives its legitimacy only through the consent of those governed. 72 Of special concern to the neo-liberals
was the right of property.73 This concern arose primarily because
liberals felt that early state constitutions did not adequately secure
74
property rights.
Liberal notions of property were first embodied in three important governing documents of the Confederation period: the
Vermont Constitution of 1777, the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 7s While each one of
these documents required the payment of just compensation for
governmental takings, the particular circumstances leading to their
Treanor, supra note 46, at 704.
See id. at 704-05 & nn.55-56 (stating that the redistributive effect of legislative
takings exposed hidden social divisions and undermined the perceived ideal of a discernible common good). In addition to James Madison, members of the looming
nonrepublican movement included such luminaries as John Adams, Benjamin Lincoln, and Theophilus Parsons. Id. at 705.
68 See Matson, supra note 64, at 17; see also Treanor, supra note 46, at 705.
69 See NEDELSKY, supra note 57, at 171 (quotation omitted).
70 Id. (discussing "inherent individual rights").
71 Id.; see also Radin, supra note 57, at 1668 (stating that the jurisprudential model
created by Richard Epstein incorporates a "classical liberal conception of private
property").
72 NEDELSKY, supra note 57, at 171 (quotation omitted).
73 Treanor, supra note 46, at 705.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 701-02. Another possible antecedent to both the Just Compensation
Clause and the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution was the Treaty of
Paris that ended the Revolutionary War with Great Britain. McConnell, supra note 29,
at 148.
66
67
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passage were different. 76 The Vermont constitution was the first to
mandate compensation for governmental takings of private property.7 7 The impetus for the clause was the New York Legislature's
refusal to recognize the land claims of New Hampshire men who
settled the territory. 71 With this in mind during their constitutional convention, citizens of Vermont sought to prevent similar
injustices by requiring that property owners be compensated for
governmental takings when their property was appropriated for
the benefit of the public.79
The trepidation toward legislative action, along with greater
recognition of individual liberties, also prompted the inclusion of
just compensation clauses in the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.80 The Massachusetts
clause was singularly liberal and was generally believed to be a
boon to the propertied class."' The legislative act widely regarded
as the most important of the Confederation period, however, was
the Northwest Ordinance. 2 During the settlement of the Northwest Territories, members of Congress worried that the creation of
territorial legislatures would jeopardize existing land grants.8 " The
just compensation clause allayed these fears and Congress adopted
the Northwest Ordinance onJuly 13, 1787, approximately six weeks
76 See Treanor, supra note 46, at 701-08 (discussing the adoption of the just compensation requirement).
77 Id. at 702. Although statehood was proclaimed by Vermonters in 1777, it was
not formally admitted into the Union until 1791. Id. at 702 n.38 (citation omitted).
78 Id. at 702. The New York Legislature was in control of the area by virtue of
monarchical decree. Id.

79 Id. The takings clause of the Vermont Constitution stated, specifically, that
"whenever any [person's] property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought
to receive an equivalent in money." VT. CONsr. OF 1777, ch. 1, art. 11 (1793).
80 Treanor, supra note 46, at 706.
81 Id. In addition to its just compensation clause, the Massachusetts Constitution,
in its Bill of Rights, contained the following Lockean dicta in Article 1:
All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential and
unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying
and defending their Lives and Liberties; that of acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their
safety and happiness.
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I; see also EdwardJ. Erler, The Great Fence to Liberty: The Right to
Property in the American Founding,in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
AMERIcAN CONSTIFUTION, supra note 29, at 43, 51.
82 CLARENCE B. CARSON, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES-BoOK II: THE
BEGINNING OF THE REPUBLIC 1775-1825 68 (1984). Along with its just compensation

clause, the Northwest Ordinance also provided for freedom of religion, habeas
corpus, jury trials, and the sanctity of private contracts. Id. at 69.
83 Treanor, supra note 46, at 707.
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FWrH AMENDMENT

Madison and the Convention

Against this backdrop of legislative attempts to curtail state abrogation of private property rights emerged the most important
statement of the new republic's commitment to securing those
rights: the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.8 5 The clause,
like many other provisions in the Bill of Rights, was authored by
James Madison, a classical eighteenth-century liberal.8 6 Although
he did not share John Locke's thesis that property was a natural
and inalienable right, Madison nonetheless regarded it as one of
the paramount institutions to be sanctioned by positive law.8 7
As a practitioner of the politics of prudence, Madison's transcendent goal in fashioning a new plan of government was finding
the appropriate balance that would make republican government
work.8 8 He believed that the chief purposes of government were
the protection of persons and the protection of property.8 9
84

McConnell, supra note 29, at 147. The Ordinance's adoption took place under

the Articles of Confederation. See SouRCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 389 (Richard L. Perry &
John C. Cooper eds., 1978) (noting that the Northwest Ordinance was adopted
before the states ratified the Constitution). The just compensation clause of the
Northwest Ordinance stated:
[NJo man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land, and should the public exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation, to take any
person's property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same.
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. II, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra, at
395.
85 See Treanor, supra note 46, at 708 (describing the synthesis of revolutionary
trends and Madisonian liberalism that evolved into the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause, which came to "dominate American legal and political thought").
86 Id. at 708, 709. For a thorough discussion of liberalism, see supra notes 63-74
and accompanying text.
87 Treanor, supra note 46, at 710. Perhaps the most incisive expression of
Madison's view of the proper relation between private property and a free government is found in The Federalist,No. 10. See NEDELSKY, supra note 57, at 24 (stating that
"[t]he finest expression of the relation between property and individual rights in
Madison's thought is, of course, The Federalist,No. 10"). Madison asserted that "the
first object of government" was "the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property." THE FEDERAlIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); see also Parenti, supranote 53, at 167 (asserting that Madison in The Federalist No. 10 was concerned with a propertyless majority assembling to disrupt the established social order).
88 NEDEISKY, supra note 57, at 37.
89 Id. at 22, 25.
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Madison, however, also perceived the inherent dualism that exists
between these two objectives: republican governments, through a
propertyless majority, placed private property in jeopardy, while
unbridled amassment and subsequent violations of property posed
serious threats to the stability of government.9" Madison's celebration of state-ensured property rights remained unflinching, however, even after ratification of the Fifth Amendment.9
Scholars differ over Madison's purpose in including the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment for ratification.9" One school
of thought contends that Madison designed the clause to have a
restricted legal application and a wider, more symbolic purpose.9"
This interpretation sets forth that only direct, physical takings by
the federal government could trigger payment of just compensation. 94 Moreover, according to this limited interpretation, a tak90 Id. at 25.
91 See generallyJAmEs MADISON, THE COMPLETE MADISON: His BASiC WRITINGS
(Saul
K. Padover ed., 1953) (providing examples of Madison's political essays).
In a 1792
essay entitled Property and Liberty, Madison explained the responsibility of
government
to act as a bulwark to property rights. James Madison, Property and Liberty,
reprintedin
THE COMPLETE MADISON: His BASIC WMTINGS, supra, at 267. After proffering
an abstract and very broad definition of property, Madison continued:
If there be a government then which prides itself on maintaining the
inviolability of property; which provides that none shall be taken directly
even for public use without indemnification to the owner, and yet directly violates the property which individuals have in their opinions, their
religion, their persons, and their faculties; nay more, which indirectly violates their property, in their actual possessions, in the labor that acquires their daily subsistence ... such a government is not a pattern for
the United States.
If the United States mean to obtain or deserve the full praise due to
wise and just governments, they will equally respect the rights of property, and the property in rights
Id. at 267, 268-69.
The essential point of this essay, it has been argued, was that property in
both its
narrow and broad formulations deserves legal protection. McConnell,
supra note 29,
at 146. That is, the right to acquire and transfer property through contracts
warrants
as much protection as the right to possession. Id.
92 See discussion infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
93 Treanor, supra note 46, at 708.
94 Id. at 711. In an early case, Chief Justice Marshall explained why
the Takings
Clause, as well as the other amendments in the Bill of Rights, has no
application to
the states:
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the
United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the
government of the individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided such limitations and
restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment
indicated. The people of the United States framed such a government
for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation,
and best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they con-
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ings clause inserted in the Bill of Rights would have an educative
effect on the people. By imbuing the national conscience with the
sanctity of property, the clause would mitigate any inclination to95
ward confiscatory tax and land redistribution policies.
Other theorists, however, believe that the Takings Clause incarnated William Blackstone's classical harm-benefit distinction
that the right of private property did not include the right to commit nuisances.9 6 Regulations that prevent harms do not require
compensation, but those that extract public benefits do. 97 This approach, therefore, rejects the notion that the clause only applies to
direct, physical takings, and instead links the requirement of compensation to an evolving state law of nuisance.9"
Despite the varied opinions on the purpose and importance of
the Takings Clause, none of the states had its delegates propose a
just compensation clause to the Philadelphia Convention.9 9 In
fact, the clause received little attention both at the Convention and
the subsequent ratification debates.10 0 It was a palpable Madisonian initiative. 10 ' Nevertheless, its overall purpose is clear: the
ferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we
think, necessarily applicable to the government created by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself;
not of distinct governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes.
If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as
applicable to the states.
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
With the application of the Takings Clause to the states via the Incorporation
Doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Anti-Federalists' fear that the clause
might be used against local governments was realized. See Treanor, supra note 46, at
708. Although the Fifth Amendment guarantee ofjust compensation has not technically been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has nevertheless
held that the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee affords the same protection against a state's taking of private property without paying just compensation. See
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (applying due process to
state takings of private property). For an in-depth discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the Incorporation Doctrine, see generally CHARLES FAMAN & STANLEY
MORRISON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY (1970).

95 Treanor, supra note 46, at 711-12.
96 Kmiec, supra note 36, at 1635.
97 See id. (discussing the harm-benefit distinction contained in the Takings
Clause).
98 Id. at 1647. Thus, the Takings Clause "properly protects what state law once
told its citizens was an identifiable and severable property interest." Id.
99 McConnell, supra note 29, at 151.
100 Treanor, supra note 46, at 708-09.
101 Id. at 709.
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Takings Clause, like many other provisions in the Bill of Rights, was
meant to be a shield for the individual property owner against overzealous property legislation. 10 2 Its underlying rationale is that the
costs of furthering public policy ought not to be borne unfairly by
the individual property owner; instead, the benefitted public
should pay through taxation. 03 As such, the Takings Clause is a
profound statement of the Framer's commitment to limited
government.10 4
B.

Early Theorists and Cases

In addition to examining the constitutional text, the general
intellectual climate of the period, and the convictions of James
Madison, another source for an original understanding of the Takings Clause is the specific interpretations of the clause by early theorists and courts acquainted with the opinions of the era. 0 5 Justice
Joseph Story, a renowned constitutional theorist, declared that the
Takings Clause affirms the great common law doctrine, founded in
natural equity, that protects private property. 10 6 This buttresses the
case for the view, mentioned previously, that the clause memorializes Lord Blackstone's7 classical harm-benefit distinction enshrined
10
in the common law.

Early cases also support this view. For example, in Young v.
McKenzie, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in dicta, posed the question of whether the Takings Clause introduced a principle of restitution that had not previously existed.10 8 Answering the question
in the affirmative, the court explained that not only had the princi102 David L. Callies, PropertyRights: Are There Any Left?, in REGULATORY
Limrrs OF LAND USE CONTROLS 247, 256 (G. Richard Hill ed., 1990).
103

TAKING: THE

James W. Ely, Jr., The Enigmatic Place of Property Rights in Modern Constitutional

Thought, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMEmCA: AmraP 200 YEARS 87, 92 (DavidJ.
Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1993).
104 See id. (stating that "the desire to achieve a public objective does not justify confiscation of private property without compensation").
105 BORK, supra note 8, at 165.
106 STORY, supra note 32, at 661. Joseph Story continued:
Indeed, in a free government, almost all other rights would become
utterly worthless, if the government possessed an uncontrollable power
over the private fortune of every citizen. One of the fundamental objects of every good government must be the due administration of justice; and how vain it would be to speak of such an administration, when
all property is subject to the will or caprice of the legislature, and the
rulers.
Id.
107 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing Lord Blackstone's classical harm-benefit distinction).
108 Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 41 (1847).
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pie been recognized by civil jurists, but it was embedded in the
common law long before its adoption in the United States
Constitution.",
The traditional common law approach to private property
rights was embraced in the late nineteenth century by Justice
Harlan.1 1 ° Focusing on the Fifth Amendment's literal language,
Justice Harlan deduced that a taking does not occur when the government is abating a public harm by exercising its police power;
rather, it is when the state encroaches on property rights to extract
public benefits that compensation must be paid.1 11 According to
this jurisprudence, the economic consequences of state action, regardless of their magnitude, never enter into the constitutional
1 12
equation.
The decline of Justice Harlan's influence on the Supreme
Court marks the advent of the next major school of compensation
theory, that of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. 13 Justice Holmes
did not espouse the qualitative differences between takings and exercises of the police power advocated by Justice Harlan. 1 4 Instead,
the Justice viewed the differences as lying on a range in which individual property owners were required to relinquish their rights
more or less according to public appetite."1 5 In considering the
economic burden inflicted by a government regulation, Justice
Holmes's approach required that some restrictions be placed on
both the police power and the right of private property.1 16
at 42.
110 Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37-38 (1964). Justice
Harlan is regarded as the "principal judicial architect of compensation theory." Id. at
38.
111 Id. Justice Brandeis later adopted this theory when he stated that:
The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The
State does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The State merely
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious,-as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions,-the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again
be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
112 Sax, supra note 110, at 39. For further discussion of Justice Harlan's formulation of the noxious use principle, see Cvek, supra note 5, at 133-34.
113 Sax, supra note 110, at 40.
114 Id. at 41.
109 Id.

115 Id.
116 Id. The crux of the Holmesian model for takings jurisprudence was expounded
in PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Mahon. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922) (stating that "[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking").
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The takings jurisprudence of both Justice Harlan and Justice
Holmes advances and affirms the original intent of the Takings
Clause, which was to protect individual property owners from hostile legislative or executive action.' 17 Their differences are matters
of degree." 8 Justice Harlan accomplishes this by looking to the
common law distinction of takings and exercise of the police
power, while Justice Holmes adopted an economic-and indeed
more protective-formulation of that principle.1' 9
V. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF THE TAKINGS DocTRiNE

The Supreme Court has recognized two classes of takings
under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause: physical
takings and regulatory takings. 2 ° While the law is well-established
1 21
with respect to physical 1takings,
the area of regulatory or implied
22
takings is still evolving.
The concept of the regulatory taking first arose in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.123 In Pennsylvania Coal, the owners of surface
rights to land above coal deposits sought injunctive relief against
the Pennsylvania Coal Company, owner of mining rights to the
117 See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Justices' interpretations of the Takings Clause).
118 SeeSax, supra note 110, at 42 (noting that the Supreme Court cites bothJustices
with similar authority).
119 See id. at 38, 41. It is appropriate to note that "Harlan and Holmes and their
divergent attitudes provide the heritage upon which the present Court has built." Id.
at 42.
120 Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public Choice on the Beachfront, 46 RUTGERs L. REv. 243, 318-19 (1993).
121 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)
(concluding that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a
taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve"). The Court recently
reaffirmed the view that a physical intrusion by government, no matter how minute, is
a taking and added that a regulation depriving a property owner of all economic and
productive uses of land requires compensation. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
122 Craig A. Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court
Approaches, 39 HASMrNrs L.J. 335, 336 (1987) [hereinafter Peterson, Land Use].
123 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (explaining that when a "regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking"). Previously, in Mugler v. Kansas, the Court refused to
acknowledge the notion of a regulatory taking. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664
(1887). Justice Harlan, in holding that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did
not restrict valid exercises of the State's police power, declared that "[i]t cannot be
supposed that the States intended, by adopting [the Fourteenth] Amendment, to impose restraints upon the exercise of their powers for the protection of the safety,
health, or morals of the community." Id. For a thorough discussion of the Pennsylvania Coal decision, see generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Test Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984).
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same parcel.1 24 The surface owners maintained that mining under
their property violated Pennsylvania's Kohler Act by jeopardizing
the integrity of the surface estate.1 2 5 The coal company sought refuge in the Fifth Amendment,12 6 alleging that the Act violated the
Takings Clause by7depriving it of the right to mine the coal located
12
within its estate.
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes recognized that to
have a workable government, the police power will often negatively
impact property rights.128 The Justice argued, however, that this
power is not without limitations. 129 When a regulation goes "too
far," the Justice opined, the Constitution mandates just compensation. 3 ' This determination, the Justice explained, would be made
on a case-by-case
basis, according proper deference to legislative
1

judgments.

13

The Court subsequently applied this principle to municipal
land-use regulations in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New

York. 132 Although precise demarcations of valid exercises of the police power had previously remained elusive, the Supreme Court
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922).
Id. at 412-13. According to the Court, the Kohler Act proscribed "the mining of
anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any
structure used as a human habitation." Id.
126 Id. at 395 (Argument for Plaintiff in Error).
127 Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the regulation as an appropriate
exercise of the state's police power. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 493
(Pa.), rev'd, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Although the Pennsylvania court noted that a substantial relationship must exist between the state's legitimate interest in protecting
the public's health, safety, or morals and the requirements of the statute, the court
accorded great deference to legislative judgments, stating that "[ilt is primarily for
the Legislature to consider and decide on the fact of a danger, then meet it by a
proper remedy." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the legislature's conviction regarding the public danger of excessive mining.
Id.
128 Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
129 Id. Otherwise, Justice Holmes stressed, both the Contracts Clause and the Due
Process Clause would be effectively emasculated. Id. Although Justice Harlan placed
limitations on a state's police power, they were not of an economic character. Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). Regulation, according to Justice Harlan, must be
substantially related to the ends sought and could not invade fundamental rights. Id.
130 Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415. One way of gauging when a regulation
has gone "too far," Justice Holmes suggested, is the extent of the diminution in the
targeted parcel's value. Id. at 413. Specifically, the Justice stated: "When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act." Id.
131 Id. Justice Holmes weighed the public concerns addressed by the statute with
the private losses incurred by Pennsylvania Coal and concluded that the magnitude of
the diminution in value warranted compensation. Id. at 413-15 (citations omitted).
132 438 U.S. 104, 136, 138 (1978) (applying Pennsylvania Coal and concluding that
application of the Landmarks Law did not effect a taking).
124
125
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nonetheless developed a framework to evaluate the constitutionalto
ity of zoning ordinances by identifying various factors 3germane
3
far.1
too
gone
has
regulation
a
whether
of
the inquiry
Penn Central Transportation Co. (Penn Central), who along
with its affiliates owned the Grand Central Terminal in New York
City, challenged operation of the city's Landmarks Preservation
Law to their property.13 4 Pursuant to the law, the Landmarks Preservation Commission denied Penn Central's application to erect
an office structure atop the Terminal.1 3 5 Penn Central then filed
suit in the New York Supreme Court claiming that the Commission's denial amounted to an arbitrary and uncompensated taking
Fourteenth
of its property in contravention of the Fifth 3 and
6
Amendments' Takings and Due Process Clauses.'
The Penn Central Court acknowledged the essentially ad hoc,
factual nature of takings inquiries.13 7 To facilitate the analysis of
whether a land-use regulation is reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose, and therefore is not a
taking, the Court propounded several factors for consideration. 3 '
These factors included the regulation's economic impact on the
claimant, its degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the state action.' 3 9 Applying these criteria to the statute, the Court concluded that the restrictions
133

Id. at 124 (citations omitted).

134 Id. at 115, 119. Under the law, the Landmarks Preservation Commission identifies properties and areas with special historical, aesthetic, or cultural value and determines whether to designate them as "landmarks." Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
Once property is deemed a landmark site, the owners must maintain the exterior in
good repair and obtain the Commission's approval for any exterior changes to the
property. Id. at 111-12 (citation omitted).
135 Id. at 116-17. The Terminal was classified as a landmark on August 2, 1967. Id.
at 115. In rejecting two plans for modification of the building's exterior, the Commission stated "[we have] no fixed rule against making additions to designated buildBut to balance a 55-story office tower
ings-it all depends on how they are done ....
above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more than an aesthetic joke."
Id. at 117-18 (quotation omitted).
136 Id. at 118-19. The trial court granted Penn Central injunctive and declaratory
relief to begin construction above the terminal. Id. at 119. The New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, reversed, holding that the Act furthered the public interest
in landmark preservation and denied Penn Central only the most profitable use of its
property. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 29-30 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1975), affd, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), affd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed, stressing that the Act allowed Penn Central a
reasonable return on its investment. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
366 N.E.2d 1271, 1278, 1279 (N.Y. 1977), affd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
137 Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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substantially advanced the general welfare through landmark preservation, preserved beneficial
uses of the property, and, therefore,
40
1
did not effect a taking.

141
Eight years later, in Nollan v. Califomia Coastal Commission,
the Supreme Court revisited the question of when a land-use restriction "substantially advance [s] legitimate state interests" but
1 42
does not "deny an owner economically viable use of his land."
The Court was faced with deciding what constitutes a legitimate
state interest and the degree of nexus required between it and the
challenged regulation.1 4
Mr. and Mrs. Nollan owned a small bungalow on beachfront
property.' 44 In an effort to comply with the condition placed on
their purchase option, the Nollans requested a permit from the
California Coastal Commission to replace the existing structure
with a three-bedroom house.' 45 The Commission approved the application subject to the Nollans' granting of a public easement
across the lot to offset any hindrances the construction would pose
46
to visual access to the adjoining community beaches.

Id. at 138. Specifically, the Court characterized the law's effect as follows:
While the law does place special restrictions on landmark properties as
a necessary feature to the attainment of its larger objectives, the major
theme of the law is to ensure owners of any such properties both a "reasonable return" on their investments and maximum latitude to use their
parcels for purposes not inconsistent with the preservation goals.
Id. at 110.
141 483 U.S. 825 (1986). For a comprehensive evaluation of Nollan, see Peterson,
Land Use, supra note 122, at 352-56.
142 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980)) (other citations omitted).
]
143 Id. Justice Scalia explained: "[o ur cases have not elaborated on the standards
for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest' or what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement that the
former 'substantially advance' the latter." Id.
144 Id. at 827.
145 Id. at 828. The Nollans leased the property with an option to buy, and when
they exercised this option, the sellers conditioned the sale on the destruction of the
bungalow and the construction of a new house to replace it. Id. at 827-28.
146 Id. at 828. After the trial court remanded the matter to the Commission to
decide whether the development would have an adverse impact on the public's access
to the beach, the Commission found that the new house would impair visual and
physical access to the shore. Id. at 828-29 (citation omitted). The Nollans then filed
suit in superior court, arguing that the permit condition violated the Takings Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 829 (citation omitted). The court
ruled in favor of the Nollans on statutory grounds. Id. The Commission appealed the
ruling to the California Court of Appeals. Id. The court of appeals reversed, stating
that the trial court erred in its application of the applicable statute. California Coastal
Comm'n v. Nollan, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31-32 (Cal. Ct. App.), rev'd, 483 U.S. 825, 837
(1986). The court also ruled that the Nollan's takings claim failed. Id. The Nollans
appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court, bypassing the California
140
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Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia determined that the Commission could promote a legitimate state interest by safeguarding
visual access to the shore. 4 7 The Justice asserted, however, that
compelling the outright relinquishment of an easement from the
Nollans for public access, rather than conditioning the building
permit on their consent, would obviously amount to a taking.1 4
The primary issue for the Nollan Court was whether an "essential
nexus" existed between the condition, which was the lateral easement, and the state interest, which was protecting the public's view
of the ocean.1 49 Concluding that no such nexus was present,15 ° the
Court ruled that the Coastal Commission's conditions effectuated a
taking of the Nollans' property without just compensation. 5
VI.

DOLAN V. C7Y OF TIGARD

Because the Coastal Commission's exaction did not share an
essential nexus with the legitimate state interest, the Nollan Court
was forced to abandon its inquiry without providing a comprehensive elucidation of the contours of its takings jurisprudence.1 5 2
The opportunity for such analysis finally arose in Dolan v. City of
Tigard,15 3 ostensibly the Supreme Court's final word on the takings
doctrine. Petitioner Dolan applied for a permit to refurbish the
site of her plumbing and electrical supply store. 154 The City Planning Commission approved the application subject to conditions
prescribed by the Community Development Code.15 5 The petiSupreme Court, to resolve the constitutional question. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 830-31 (citations omitted).
147 Noan, 483 U.S. at 827, 835-36 (citation omitted).
148 Id. at 831.
149 See id. at 837 (discussing the importance of meeting the "essential nexus" test).
Justice Scalia insisted that "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of
land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion."' Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v.
Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981)).
150 Id. at 837. Justice Scalia stated that "[w]hatever may be the outer limits of 'legitimate state interests' in the takings and land-use context, this is not one of them." Id.
151 Id. at 841-42. Specifically, the Court stated that if California wants "an easement
across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it." Id.
152 Id. (finding that the Commission's belief that the community interest would be
furthered could not justify the imposed exaction).
153 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
154 Id. at 2313. The store rests on a 1.67-acre lot and comprises approximately
9,700 square feet. Id. Fanno Creek runs through the southwestern portion of the lot,
as well as its western boundary. Id. Areas within its 100-year floodplain are unsuitable
for commercial development. Id.
155 Id. at 2314. The City of Tigard, located on the outskirts of Portland, enacted the
Community Development Code pursuant to the State of Oregon's comprehensive
land use management policy. Id. at 2313 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-197.860
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tioner was required to pledge a portion of the parcel for renovating a storm drainage system.15 6 Additionally, the 7city sought to
15
exact a pedestrian/bicycle pathway from the land.
(1993)). In 1973, the Oregon legislature declared that the "[u]ncoordinated use of
lands within this state threaten orderly development, the environment of this state
and the health, safety, order, convenience, prosperity and welfare of the people of
this state." § 197.005(1). The legislature thus created the Land Conservation and
Development Commission and the Department of Land Conservation and Development, which together are charged with the responsibility to identify and adopt goals
and guidelines to control land-use planning in Oregon. §§ 197.075, 197.225, 197.240.
Under the statute, each city and county in Oregon must adopt a "comprehensive
plan" and implement regulations in accordance with the goals adopted by the Land
Conservation and Development Commission. § 197.175. Oregon law defines a "comprehensive plan" as:
[A] generalized, coordinated land use map and policy statement of the
governing body of a local government that interrelates all functional
and natural systems and activities relating to the use of lands, including
but not limited to sewer and water systems, transportation systems, educational facilities, recreational facilities, and natural resources and air
and water quality management programs.
§ 197.015(5).
The statute further defines "comprehensive" as "all-inclusive, both in terms of
geographic area covered and functional and natural activities and systems occurring
in the area covered by the plan." § 197.015(5). A land-use plan is considered "coordinated" when "the needs of all levels of governments, semipublic and private agencies
and the citizens of Oregon have been considered and accommodated as much as
possible." § 197.015(5). Once the comprehensive plan sets forth the governing land
use policies for the jurisdiction, those policies must be implemented through one or
more land use regulations. § 197.010(c). Oregon law defines "land use regulation"
to encompass "any local government zoning ordinance, land division ordinance ... or
similar general ordinance establishing standards for implementing a comprehensive
plan." § 197.015(11).
Under the Community Development Code (CDC), property owners within the
zone entitled "Central Business District" must accommodate a 15% landscaping and
open-space requirement. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313 (citation omitted). This requirement limits the total coverage of buildings and parking space to 85% of the lot. Id.
156 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314. The City of Tigard crafted a Master Drainage Plan in
response to flooding that occurred in the vicinity of Fanno Creek, including that portion of the creek that passed through petitioner's parcel. Id. at 2313 (citations omitted). The expansion of impervious surfaces due to continued development, the plan
established, would aggravate the city's flooding problems. Id. To address these
problems, the Drainage Plan proposed improvements along the Fanno Creek Basin,
encompassing channel excavation adjacent to petitioner's property and creating a
greenway along the length of the creek. Id.
157 Id. at 2314. The city enacted the plan for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway in response to a study indicating that congestion in the Central Business District was a
serious problem. Id. at 2313 (footnote omitted). The city intended the plan to encourage alternate means of transportation for short trips, and the CDC enlists those
seeking new development to facilitate the plan by requiring dedications of land for
the pathways in certain areas. Id. The CDC states, in pertinent part:
The development shall facilitate pedestrian/bicycle circulation if the
site is located on a street with designated bikepaths or adjacent to a
designated greenway/open space/park. Specific items to be addressed:
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After the City Council endorsed the Commission's action,15
Dolan petitioned the Land Use Board of Appeals, alleging that the
dedication requirements were insufficiently related to her development plans and, therefore, constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 159 The Board
found a "reasonable relationship" between the permit exactions
and the impacts of the proposed
redevelopment, 160 and Oregon's
1 61
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Upholding the decisions of the lower courts, the Oregon
Supreme Court ruled that Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
created a "reasonably related" test instead of a more stringent "es-

sential nexus" test and, furthermore, that the City of Tigard established such a relationship in this case. 162 To resolve an apparent
conflict between Nollan and the decision of the Oregon Supreme
Court, 6 ' the United States Supreme Court granted Dolan's peti-

tion for certiorari.'6' The issue before the Court was whether there
existed an essential nexus between a legitimate interest of the city

and the permit conditions and, if so, what necessary degree of connection must exist between the city's exactions and the likely effect
(i) Provision of efficient, convenient and continuous pedestrian and bicycle transit circulation systems, linking developments by requiring dedication and construction of pedestrian and bikepaths identified in the
comprehensive plan. If direct connections cannot be made, require
that the funds in the amount of the construction costs be deposited into
an account for the purpose of constructing paths.
Id. at 2313 n.1 (quoting CDC § 18.86.040A.l.b).
158 Id. at 2315 (citation omitted). The City Council, however, required that the
city's engineering department-not petitioner-conduct the surveying and marking
of the floodplain area. Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) assumed that Tigard's findings
about the proposed development's impacts were bolstered by substantial evidence.
Id. First, because petitioner's redevelopment would increase the parcel's imperviousness and storm-water runoff into the creek, LUBA maintained, a reasonable relationship existed between the development exaction to create a greenway along the creek
and the proposed development. Id. Moreover, LUBA noted that a larger store would
attract more customers and employees and their vehicles, and concluded that a dedication for a pathway to alleviate this congestion was reasonably related to that problem. Id. Therefore, LUBA rejected the Fifth Amendment argument. Id.
161 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853, 856 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 854 P.2d
437 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected
Dolan's assertion that the Supreme Court abandoned the "reasonable relationship"
test in Nollan, in favor of a more rigid "essential nexus" test. Id. at 855. For a discussion of the NoUan case, see supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
162 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 443 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994).
165 Dolan, 114 S.Ct. at 2315-16.
164 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
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of the planned development.165

In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,' 66 the United States
Supreme Court reversed Oregon's highest court, holding that the
city's dedication requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of private property for public use.167 The Chief Justice began
by recounting the fundamental purpose of the Takings Clause. 16
The ChiefJustice, reminiscent of Nollan, postulated that absent the
permit conditions, the city's demands would have undoubtedly
been a taking.1 69 Acknowledging that in certain cases the police
power authorizes state and local governments to regulate land use
without compensating landowners, 170 the Court maintained that
those decithe facts in Dolan could be readily distinguished from
17
sions affirming a state interest in land-use planning. 1
Turning to the Nollan analysis, the Court noted that the development exactions bore a sufficient link to the city's land-use management policy. 17 The dedication of petitioner's property for a
drainage system and pathway, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned,
would adequately promote the objectives of preventing flooding
and alleviating traffic congestion.1 73 An issue remained, however,
as to the requisite degree of connection between the conditions
imposed on petitioner's7 permit and the anticipated impact of the
planned development. 1
165 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837, 838).
Id. at 2312. The Chief Justice was joined byJustices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy,
and O'Connor. Id.
167 Id. at 2322 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
168 Id. at 2316. That purpose is, according to the Court, "to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole." Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
169 Id. (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831).
170 Id. (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating that a landuse regulation does not constitute a "taking" where the regulation "substantially advance [s] legitimate state interests" and fails to "den [y] an owner economically viable
use of his land"); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926)
(holding that local governments have the authority to participate in land-use planning); Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413 (explaining the importance of the government's power to regulate rights incident to property ownership without having to
compensate landowners)).
171 Id. The facts in Dolan differ from those cases upholding land-use regulation,
Chief Justice Rehnquist stressed, in two respects: First, prior cases involved regulations impinging on entire areas of a city, but here they targeted a single parcel. Id.
Second, the present case was not only a limitation on petitioner's land use, but a
demand that she deed a portion of her property to the city. Id.
172 Id. at 2318.
166

173

Id.

174

Id. (citations omitted).
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To formulate a test, the majority examined the nexus demanded by the various state courts 175 and adopted a middle-tier
approach: a reasonable relationship must be shown between the
176
mandatory dedication and the proposed development's effect.
Endeavoring to avoid confusion with the "rational basis" test used
in other constitutional areas, the ChiefJustice substituted the term
"reasonable relationship" with "rough proportionality."177 Chief
Justice Rehnquist opined that this test does not require mathematical precision; instead, rough proportionality demands that the city
perform an individualized determination that the compulsory exactions are related to both the character and scope of the effect of
1 78
the anticipated development.
Applying this new test, the Chief Justice searched for rough
proportionality between Tigard's exaction demands and the projected impact of Dolan's plans for expansion. 179 First, the majority
examined the requirement that petitioner deed her land to the city
for incorporation into its storm drainage system. 18 0 The Court
agreed that an increase in the amount of a parcel's impervious surface would increase the storm-water runoff from the tract. 181 The
Court also agreed that in furtherance of its flood control policy,
the city could require Dolan to refrain from encroaching upon the
Id. at 2318-19. The Court first refused to adopt the tests of New York and Montana which only required the government to provide generalized statements about
the nexus between the exaction and planned development. Id. This standard, the
Court concluded, is "too lax." Id. at 2319. The majority similarly rejected a "very
exacting" standard that would compel the government to show that the connection is
directly proportional. Id. The majority cited the Illinois Supreme Court as the leading proponent of this test, known as the "specifically and uniquely attributable test."
Id. (citing Pioneer Tr. & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,
802 (Ill. 1961)). The Court also noted that a minority of other state courts have also
embraced this test. Id. at 2319 n.7 (citing J.E.D. Assocs., Inc., v. Town of Atkinson,
432 A.2d 12, 15 (N.H. 1981); Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Wayne, 66 N.J.
582, 602, 334 A.2d 30, 40 (1975); McKain v. Toledo City Planning Comm'n, 270
N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio 1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910,
913 (RI. 1970)).
176 Id. at 2319. The Court pointed out that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision
in Simpson v. City of North Platteis illustrative of this "reasonable relationship" test. Id.
(citing Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301-02 (Neb. 1980) (holding
that a city could not require a landowner to dedicate privately owned property for
future public use by imposing conditions on a building permit where the future use
does not result from the owner's construction)).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 2319-20.
179 Id. at 2320.
180 Id.
181 Id.
175
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floodplain.18 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded; however, that
Tigard went too far because petitioner's proposed new building
did not reasonably relate to a need for conveyance of a floodplain
easement. 8 3
The Court also concurred with the city's finding that an expansion of petitioner's business would increase vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the vicinity."M Moreover, the Court noted that
compelling property dedications for roads, sidewalks, and other
public paths has generally been recognized as a reasonable method
for mitigating the added congestion associated with a proposed
property use.' 8 5 The majority remained dissatisfied, however, with
the city's conclusory statement that the creation of a pathway could
offset a portion of the traffic demand and reduce any increase in
traffic congestion.18 6 Accordingly, the Court held that the rough
proportionality test had not been satisfied, and the city's exactions
amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth
7
Amendment.

8

Vigorously dissenting, Justice Stevens criticized the majority
both for the creation of the rough proportionality test and its operation in the present case.'
The Justice first pointed to the absence of federal precedent supporting the majority's decision. 8 9
Moreover, the dissent argued, the state cases upon which the Court
relied do not ineluctably lead to the new test.' 90
More specifically, Justice Stevens argued, the additional requirement that a city demonstrate rough proportionality between a
permit exaction and the impact of the proposed development was
a manifestation ofjudicial atavism: it revived a breed of substantive
182 Id.
183 Id. The Court proclaimed that the petitioner's "right to exclude would not be
regulated, it would be eviscerated." Id. at 2321. The Court pointed out that the city
did not merely seek to prevent development of the land, but, rather, wanted to appropriate petitioner's land for the Greenway system. Id. at 2320.
184 Id. at 2321.

185 Id.
186 Id. at 2321-22. The ChiefJustice asserted: "No precise mathematical calculation
is required, but the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of
the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement
that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated." Id. at 2322 (emphasis
added).
187 See id. (explaining that although the city's goals are "laudable," the Constitution
imposes limits with respect to how the city could accomplish it goals) (citation
omitted).
188 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined byJustices Blackmun and
Ginsburg in dissenting. Id.
189 Id. at 2322-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 2323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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due process that for many decades lay fallow. 19 1 Additionally, the
Justice faulted the majority for placing the burden of proof on the
city, thereby erecting a formidable barrier to effective land-use
planning.19 2 For these reasons, the dissent asserted, the rough proportionality test and its present application "break considerable
193
and unpropitious new ground."
In a separate dissent, Justice Souter also criticized the majority
for fashioning a standard that goes beyond the dictates of Nollan. 9 4
The Justice reasoned that the Court could have resolved the issues
presented in Dolan by adhering to Nollan's principles.' 9 5 According to Justice Souter, the majority's uneasiness with Tigard's permit
conditions did not stem from lack of proportionality; rather, it
arose from lack of a rational nexus between the governmental interest and the property exactions. 1 96 The Justice concluded by declaring the inappropriateness of placing the onus to prove
relationships on the city, reasoning that established precedent afforded governmental regulations a traditional presumption of
constitutionality. 9 7
VI.

CONCLUSION

The result in Dolan strikes a reasonable balance between legislative power and individual liberties: a balance that is consistent
with the Framer's design of the American Republic. If the City of
Tigard is able to establish the rough proportionality between its
property exaction and the projected impact of the proposed development required by the Court, then there will be no need to compensate Mrs. Dolan. Such a requirement is in accordance with the
common law's harm-benefit distinction that animates the Takings
Clause.
In formulating a more precise and comprehensive inquiry, by
first calling for an essential nexus between a development exaction
and a legitimate state interest, and then rough proportionality between the exaction and developmental impacts, the Court recognizes that as the modern regulatory state continues to grow and
metastasize, the distinction between averting harms and compel191 Id. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 2323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 2330 (Souter, J., dissenting).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 2331 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ling benefits often becomes nebulous. 198 Moreover, by placing the
burden to demonstrate rough proportionality on the city-albeit a
break from precedent-the majority forces municipalities to think
before they act and ensure they are not targeting an individual to
defray what is actually a public expense. In its entirety, this test
furthers the objective of the Fifth Amendment by requiring courts
in takings cases to concentrate on the harm-benefit distinction inherent in property rights in order to protect individuals from capricious and inequitable exercises of the police power, while at the
same time acknowledging the proper use of that power. 9 9
Dolan is not, as the dissent believes, a resurgence of substantive
due process. Its precursor, Nollan, conceded no substantive limitation, except in a footnote, on a state's police power.2 0 0 The cases
that recognized substantive due process rights, such as Lochner v.
New York 20 1 and Roe v. Wade,2 °2 employed a procedural constitu198 See Kmiec, supra note 36, at 1636-37 (quoting Professor Allison Dunham). Specifically, Professor Dunham argues that:
It is unconstitutional to compel an owner to commit his land to park
use in order to meet the public desire for a park, but an owner may be
compelled to furnish a portion of his land for a park where the need for
a park results primarily from activity on other land of the owner. It is
unconstitutional to compel him to use his land as a parking lot in order
to obtain a parking lot for the community, but it is within constitutional
power to compel an owner to provide a parking lot for the parking
needs of activities on his own land.... It is not permissible to compel
an owner to hold land in reserve for industrial purposes by restricting
his use to industrial purposes only, but it is permissible to exclude industrial development from districts where such development will harm
other uses in the district.
Allison Dunham, A Legal And Economic Basis For City Planning(Making Room For Robert
Moses, William Zeckendorf, And A City PlannerIn The Same Community), 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 650, 666-67 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
199 Kmiec, supra note 36, at 1640.
200 Id. at 1651. In what Professor Kmiec refers to as "what may be destined to become another famous footnote four," Justice Scalia wrote:
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California's
attempt to remedy [the various regulatory] problems, although they
had not contributed to it [sic] more than other coastal landowners, the
State's action, even if otherwise valid, might violate either the incorporated Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
Id. (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835-36 n.4 (1987)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))).
201 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court found a substantive right of "freedom
of contract" in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 56. As such,
the limitation of employment in bakeries to 60 hours a week and 10 hours a day could
not be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power to protect the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare. Id. at 64-65. For a discussion of Lochner, see Daniel
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tional provision, the Due Process Clause, to create rights not expressly found in the Constitution. The Takings Clause, however,
explicitly presumes a substantive right to property that cannot be
infringed for public benefit without just compensation. °3 Justice
Stevens's pejorative notwithstanding,2 0 4 property owners do indeed
have rights worthy of protection. As Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment should be
given the same reverence accorded to other provisions in the Bill
of Rights.

20 5

Modem takings jurisprudence, therefore, adheres to the original intent of the Takings Clause. Although some scholars argue
persuasively that James Madison intended the clause to have limited application-that is, it only applies to direct, physical takings2 6 -their approach takes a far too narrow view of original
understanding. The question is not how Madison and the other
Framers would have decided a particular case, but whether the
facts in a case before the Court warrant the protections of the general principles they placed in the Constitution. 0 v In Mrs. Dolan's
0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. LJ. 215, 216 (1987)
(stating that the decision "heralded the Court's first sustained commitment to the use
of substantive due process") and Charles B. Blackmar, NeutralPrinciplesand Substantive
Due Process, 35 ST. Louis U. LJ. 511, 513 (1991) (remarking that the doctrine of substantive due process "got a bad name in Lochner v. New York").
202 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Supreme Court, perJustice Blackmun, ruled
that the substantive "right to privacy," whether in the Ninth or Fourteenth Amendment, includes the right of a woman to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. Id. at 153,
154. For a discussion of Roe and the subsequent refinements of its holding, see Conkle, supra note 201, at 220-21.
203 Cf Kmiec, supra note 36, at 1651 (noting that Nollan v. California CoastalComm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1986), does not signal a return to Lochner v. New York, but, "[q]uite the
contrary, not to observe the distinction [between using the police power to avoid
harm rather than to extract benefits] would be as much a judicial abdication as declaring the first amendment's speech protections to be an empty vessel capable of
being filled however the legislature wished"). Id.
204 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2326 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (commenting that "property owners have surely found a new friend today").
205 Id. at 2320.
206 Treanor, supra note 46, at 711.
207 Cf BoRK, supra note 8, at 167 (stating that judges must discern constitutional
meaning as each case arises). Judge Bork provides a lucid illustration of this point
when he recognizes that:
The world changes in which unchanging values find their application.
The fourth amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, was framed by men who did not foresee electronic surveillance. But that did not make it wrong for judges to apply the central
value of that amendment to electronic invasions of personal privacy.
The power of Congress to regulate commerce was established by men
who did not foresee the scope, technologies, and intricate interdependence of today's economy. But that did not make it wrong for judges to
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case, the question was asked, and answered, correctly.
Daniel A. Ippolito

forbid states the power to impose burdensome regulations on the interstate movements of trailer trucks. The first amendment's guarantee of
freedom of the press was written by men who had not the remotest idea
of modem forms of communication. But that does not make it wrong
for a judge to find the values of the first amendment relevant to radio
and television broadcasting.
Id. at 168.

